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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case: In this legal malpractice action arising out of divorce proceedings,
plaintiff wife alleges that defendant attorneys negligently recommended that plaintiff enter into a
Property Settlement Agreement ("PSA"). More, specifically, plaintiff alleges that (I) attorneys
failed to provide security for her husband's financial obligation in the PSA, and (2) advised her that
such security was in place. The available security was a mortgage instrument due to payoff to
husband as mortgagee in a lump sum six months hence. According to the PSA:
Darwin shall pay Patricia $800,000 in cash, by wire transfer or
certified check, within five (5) days of payment by the Status
Corporation, or its assigns . . . In the event of breach, Darwin
may also be able to foreclose a mortgage on that portion of that land
referred to prior to the sale to Status Corporation as "Albrethsen
Farm".

R. p. 374.
Plaintiffs ex-husband received the mortgage proceeds without paying her the amount due
under the PSA (R. p. 374). Although the PSA did not give her an express security interest in the
mortgage, defendants had advised plaintiff multiple times that upon recordation of the judgment (with
its incorporated PSA) the judgment would become a lien "on all of [the ex-husband's] real and
personal property" (R. pp. 298, 523).
Defendants immediately recorded the judgment, but it is undisputed that the mortgage payout
to the ex-husband was not encumbered by any lien rights in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff's ex-husband
ultimately paid her a portion of the $800,000 due under the PSA, but there remains a substantial
shortfall. This shortfall constitutes the damages prayed for in the Complaint (R. p. 10).
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Course of proceedings and disposition:

Plaintiff alleged in the Complaint:
In November, 2007, defendant Walker and other agents of defendant
Cosho Humphrey negligently recommended that the plaintiff enter into
a Property Settlement Agreement ("PSA") with her then-husband
Darwin McKay which contemplated that plaintiff would receive a
portion of the proceeds from the 2008 closing of the Status Corporation
transaction as follows:
As a further proximate result of defendants' negligence, in November
2008, following entry of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Lawyers
Title Insurance Company paid Darwin $1,288,019.10, to the exclusion
of plaintiff, on the McKay community's interest as mortgagee in the
Status Corporation mortgage. Notwithstanding the terms of the PSA,
Darwin has refused to pay plaintiff any portion of those funds as
required by that agreement.
R. pp. 11,12
After the Complaint was filed, written discovery was undertaken and the plaintiff Patricia
McKay was deposed as well as plaintiff's expert, attorney Bryan D. Smith. Thereafter, defendants filed
a summary judgment motion and two motions for reconsideration.
(1)

Summary judgment: denied (the Honorable Ronald Wilper): Among the grounds

alleged, defendants asserted that plaintiff failed to establish that she had "some chance for success" in
the underlying action had the PSA not been consummated. (R. p. 580). Rejecting this argument, the
district court ruled that there were "genuine issues of material fact" which precluded summary
adjudication (R. p.581).
Also, the district rejected the argument that defendants are not responsible for the actions of
plaintiff's ex-husband. The Court opined that the form of the PSA (no legal description or instrument
number included) coupled with the defendants' reference to the PSA as a security instrument raised
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issues of fact concerning defendants' negligence (R. p. 580).
Finally, rejecting the assertion that the conduct of plaintiffs ex-husband was a superseding
cause of her damages, the Court opined that the ex-husband's breaching conduct was the very evil
sought to be avoided by the security which defendants had advised plaintiff was in place (R. p. 579).
(2) Motion for reconsideration: denied (the Honorable Ronald Wilper): Here defendants
argued that the Court "unreasonably inferred that Mrs. McKay was referring to the Albrethsen property
instead of the Home Farm property when she emailed Mr. Walker on October 23, 2007" (R. p. 857).
That email inquired whether a lien could placed on "Status Corp. closure so that the $800,000 are paid
to me by them?" (R. p. 298). Defendant Walker replied in the affirmative (R. p. 298).
The payoff on the Albrethsen mortgage by Status Corporation was to occur on the same date
as the sale of property to Status referred to as the "Home Farm". The Court opined that plaintiffs
reference to "closure" could refer to either transaction. This ambiguity created a genuine issue of fact
which made summary judgment improper (R. p. 860)
(3) Second motion for reconsideration: granted (the Honorable Jason Scott):
(a) No breach of duty(defendants did record the PSA): The Court opined that security
interests in a domestic property settlement agreement can be created consensually or by operation of
law (R. pp. 968, 969). In general terms, the Court concluded that defendants cannot be faulted for
failing to obtain a consensual security interest or, alternatively, for failing to create a security interest
by operation of law.
Respecting a consensual security interest, the Court concluded that the defendants cannot be
faulted for failing to extract such security agreement from plaintiffs ex-husband (R. p. 969).
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As to a security interest by operation oflaw, the fact that the defendants recorded the judgment
in several counties, "they ensured that McKay obtained a judgment lien on her husband's real property".
However, opined the Court, under Idaho law, "the definition of "real property" in section 55-101 is
simply not broad enough to encompass a mortgage" (R. p. 969). That is, according to the District
Court, the "mortgage on the Albrethsen property was personal property". (Id). As such, failure to make
a public record for the ex-husband's ownership of the mortgage, was not a breach of duty.
(b) No proximate causation I (real property not available as security): In finding the
absence of proximate causation, the district court concluded:
Consequently, even assuming arguendo that Walker and Cosho
Humphrey breached a duty to McKay by not including the Albrethsen's
property legal description and her ex-husband's mortgage instrument
number in the PSA, McKay's claims would be unfit for trial without
evidence of a causal relationship between that breach and the damages
she claims.
R. p 972
The District Court concluded (as it did in connection with the breach-of-duty issue) that because
the Albrethsen mortgage was not an interest in real property, defendants did not cause plaintiff any
damage. That is, opined the Court, no amount of"slick drafting" could have created a security interest
(R. p. 971 ). The District Court did observe that the recorded judgment constituted a non-consensual
judgment lien on real property owned by the ex-husband (R. 969). But even if the instrument number
and real property description had been included in the judgment, opined the Court, "the evidence
therefore does not support the conclusion that . . . McKay would have shared in the proceeds her
husband received
(c)

. . ." (R. p. 973).

No proximate causation II (no evidence that ex-husband would have agreed to a
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security interest or that trial would have resulted in a better outcome): Here the Court concluded that
there is no evidence that plaintiffs ex-husband would have granted plaintiff a security interest had that
been a non-negotiable point with plaintiff. Also, the Court opined that, had she eschewed the proposed
PSA, "the Handwritten Agreement" would have blocked her path back to divorce court" (R. p. 974)
In short, the district court concluded that plaintiff "has not offered evidence that either option
[further negotiation or trial] would have led to a better outcome than her actual outcome" (R. p.974)
Disposition: Based upon its Memorandum Decision and Order (R. pp. 957 - 976), the District

Court entered judgment against plaintiff (R. p. 977), granting defendants' second motion for
reconsideration.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Formation of divorce settlement and plaintiffs expectations: On October 20, 2007, the plaintiff
and her husband, Darwin McKay, undertook to mediate the issues raised by their divorce litigation. At
the conclusion of mediation, the mediator, the Honorable Duff McKee, prepared a handwritten
settlement agreement ("Handwritten Agreement") (R. p. 269) which both parties executed. This
agreement provided in part:
If Status (Union Development) real estate transaction is completed
in March of 2008, Husband will pay Wife $800,000 out of proceeds
. . . If the deal falls, Husband will pay Wife $500,000 within 6
months.
. . . Parties, through counsel, to incorporate these terms into a
comprehensive property settlement agreement.
R. p. 270.
Unlike the Handwritten Agreement, the subsequent PSA referenced the Albrethsen mortgage
as the source offunds for the ex-husband's $800,000 payment: "Darwin may also be able to foreclose"
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the Status mortgage on the "Albrethsen Farm" in the event Status "breached" its agreement to purchase
the "Home Farm" (R. p. 374). See full text at page 2 above.
In her affidavit in this case, plaintiff referenced her expectations of security by the Albrethsen
mortgage at the time of settlement as informed by the advice of defendant Walker:
I held this belief at the time of settlement based upon the statement of
my attorney Thomas Walker, that the recorded judgment of divorce
would be a lien on the mortgage held by Mr. McKay on the Status
Corporation obligation of approximately $1 .4 million.
R. p. 552
Prior to settlement, defendants confirmed to plaintiff that the Albrethsen mortgage constituted
security for her ex-husband's $800,000 obligation. In an October 23, 2007, email, prior to executing
the PSA, Mr. Walker advised plaintiff:
Our plan is to record the judgment and decree of divorce, which then
becomes a lien on all of Darwin's real and personal property. We don't
want to emphasize this aspect of the settlement. So we don't want to say
anything until the judge signs the Judgment and Decree.

R. p. 298
Thereafter, on December 15, 2008, Mr. Walker again advised plaintiff by letter:
We subsequently recorded the judgment in each county that you thought
Darwin owned real and personal property. By virtue of Idaho Code §
10-1011, (sic) your judgment becomes a lien on Darwin's real and
personal property.
. . . Thus, the mortgage that Lawyers Title accepted from Darwin
should be subject to the lien of the judgment.
R. pp. 522
In her affidavit opposing summary judgment, plaintiff testified that, barring the acquisition of
security, she would have proceeded to trial had she known that recordation of the PSA would not
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subject the Albrethsen mortgage "to the lien of the judgment". (R. p. 552)
Disbursement of mortgage proceeds: Although not relevant to the issues presented, a title defect
brought Lawyer's Title Insurance Corporation into the picture. In approximately December 2008, the
ex-husband received $1.2 million as mortgagee of the Albrethsen mortgage.
As described by Mr. Walker in the December 2008, letter to plaintiff:
Regarding the assignment to Lawyer's Title Insurance Corporation, I
was able to determine that Darwin made a claim against a title insurance
policy issued by Lawyer's Title with regard to the Status Corporation
transaction. I could not find out the exact amount of the insurance claim
payment but my perception is that it was more than the $800,000 that
Darwin owes you.

R. p. 523
In its Memorandum Decision, the Honorable Jason Scott described the Lawyer's Title payout
to the ex-husband Darwin arising from the obligation of the Albrethsen mortgagee as follows:
Status Corporation failed to pay the mortgage on the Albrethsen
property. As a result, McKay's ex-husband sued Status Corporation. In
August 2008, he received a judgment for more than 1.2 million against
Status Corporation based on the mortgage loan. Status Corporation did
not pay McKay's ex-husband the judgment amount. Instead, because a
title company had mistakenly insured the first-priority position of
multiple Albrethsen property lienholders, including McKay's exhusband, it paid him the judgment amount in return for an assignment
of the judgment.
R. p. 960.
As noted above, the ex-husband Darwin failed to remit the $800,000to plaintiff wife as required
by the PSA. She now claims this failed payment as damages proximately caused by defendants
malpractice.
Evidence of malpractice: According to plaintiff's expert, Bryan D. Smith, defendants' conduct
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fell below the standard of care for an Idaho attorney, including the following: ( 1) Failing to include the
legal description of the Albrethsen Farm in the PSA as well as the instrument number of the mortgage;
(2) Failing to record a summary of the PSA as authorized by Idaho Code§ 32-918; and (3) Advising
plaintiff that the divorce judgment constituted a lien on the mortgage proceeds.
R. pp. 495-496.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the alleged tort of malpractice fails due to the absence of a breach of duty
as a matter of law;

2.

Whether the alleged tort of malpractice fails due to the absence of proximate causation.
as a matter of law.

3.

Assuming these issues are not barred as a matter of law, whether genuine issues of
material fact exist which preclude the entry of summary judgment.

ARGUMENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
With respect to appellate review of the herein summary judgment, the Supreme Court
adheres to the following standard:
This Court exercises free review over appeals from a grant of summary
judgment and the standard it applies is "the same as the standard used by
the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Stonebrook
Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927,929,277 P.3d
374,376 (2012) (quoting Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148
Idaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458, 461 (2008)). Summary judgment is
therefore proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When applying this standard, this
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Court construes disputed facts, and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the record, in favor of the non-moving party. Curlee, 148
Idaho at 394,224 P.3d at 461. Where "the evidence reveals no disputed
issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which
this Court exercises free review." [cases cited]

Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 690, 302 P.3d 26 (2013 ).
THE DISTRJCT COURT BASED ITS DECISION ON THE ERRONEOUS LEGAL
CONCLUSION THAT THE ALBRETHSEN MORTGAGE WAS PERSONAL PROPERTY
AND NOT COULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE LIEN OF THE DIVORCE JUDGMENT.
A mortgage on real property is an interest in real property and, like all real property, subject to
judgment liens under Idaho Code § 10-1110. Multiple Idaho statutes treat mortgages as the equivalent
of an interest in real property:
Idaho Code § 8-506A( d): Any interest of the defendant as mortgagee
of a real estate mortgage
may be attached. The sheriff must
record with the county recorder where the real property is located a
copy of the writ along with a notice in writing, naming the defendant,
describing the real property, and identifying the recording information
on the real estate mortgage or trust deed, . . . The recorder shall
index the same as an assignment of the defendants' interest in the
mortgage or deed of trust, and it shall be constructive notice to the world
of the attachment.
(emphasis added).
Absent an instrument number and legal description, the sheriff would be unable to undertake
the recording duties described in the statute.
This statute underscores the treatment of a mortgage as an interest as real property. More to the
point, in order for plaintiff as judgment creditor to perfect a lien against the ex-husband's mortgagee
interest, the judgment must include the legal description of the mortgaged "real property" and identify
"the recording information on the real estate mortgage". In that fashion, the plaintiff's interest in the
mortgage is put onto the public record as with any real estate holding. Properly drafted, plaintiff's

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - l 0

judgment accomplishes two things: (1) it establishes the ex-husband's status as a judgment debtor; and
(2) it identifies his interest in real property against which that judgment can constitute a lien.
The District Court opines that the mortgage proceeds are the husband's separate property. This
correct observation is neither here nor there. See Memorandum Decision (R. p. 14, 15). If ownership
of an asset prevented money judgment liens from attaching, the collection business would cease to
exist, at least as we know it.
According to the testimony of plaintiff's expert Bryan Smith:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

You're calling a mortgage real property?
Yes. It's a property interest.
Are you calling a mortgage real property?
I'm saying it's an interest in real property.

R. p. 668

And:
Q. If the property settlement agreement gave the proceeds to Mr.
McKay, how could Mr. Walker have represented in good faith to a title
company that Mrs. McKay had an interest in those proceeds?
A. Mr Walker had already told-had already concluded that he thought
there was a lien that was created by virtue of recording the decree of
divorce.
R. p. 677

In characterizing a mortgage as personal property, the District Court conflates the money
proceeds generated by the underlying mortgage debt (personal property) with the mortgage itself (real
property)
Other Idaho statutes which treat a mortgage as a real property interest:
Idaho Code § 45-902: MORTGAGE MUST BE IN WRITING. A
mortgage, deed of trust or transfer in trust can be created, renewed or
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extended only by writing, executed with the formalities required in the
case of a grant or conveyance of real property.
Idaho Code § 45-908. Power of attorney to mortgage. A power of
attorney to execute a mortgage, or deed of trust must be in writing,
subscribed, acknowledged, or proved, certified and recorded in like
manner as powers of attorney for grants of real property.
Idaho Code§ 55-811. RECORD AS NOTICE. Every conveyance of real
property acknowledged or proved, and certified, and recorded as
prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for record,
is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers
and mortgag(e)es.
Idaho Code §55-813. Conveyance defined. The term "conveyance" as
used in this chapter, embraces every instrument in writing by which any
estate or interest in real property is created, alienated, mortgaged or
encumbered, or by which the title to any real property may be affected,
except wills.
(emphasis added)
In Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489,236 P.3d 1249 (2010), the Supreme Court opined that an
analogue to a mortgage, a deed of trust, is an interest in real property: "Because a deed of trust is an
interest in real property, it falls under the terms of I.C. § 9-503 [statute of frauds]. See Black's Law
Dictionary 445 (8 th Ed. 2004) ("[D]eed of trust. A deed conveying title to real property to a trustee as
security until the grantor repays a loan.)". Id., 149 Idaho at 493.
Black's defines a mortgage as: "A conveyance of title to property that is given as security for
the payment of a debt

. . . that will become void upon payment". Black's Law Dictionary 1026

(7 th Ed. 1999).
The District Court erroneously characterized a mortgage as "personal property" (R. p.963):
With respect to the character of a mortgage, the district erroneously concluded that mortgages constitute
"personal property":
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. . . Walker and Cosho Humphrey cannot be faulted for the fact that
the PSA does not contain an express grant to McKay of a security
interest in her husband's mortgage on the Albrethsen property. . .
McKay's ex-husband's mortgage on the Albrethsen property was
personal property. Accordingly, recording the divorce decree, which
incorporated the PSA, did not give McKay a judgment lien on the
mortgage.
R. p. 969 (emphasis added).
First, citing Idaho Code § 10-1110, the District Court concedes that the McKay judgment, as
recorded, becomes judgment lien on "in her husband's real property (R. p. 969). But citing Idaho Code
§ 55-101, the District Court concluded that a real estate mortgage is not "real property" as defined by
Idaho Code § 55-101 and, hence, cannot be encumbered by the judgment lien referenced in Idaho Code
§ 10-1110 (R. p. 969).
Section 55-101 states: "Real property defined. - Real property or real estate consists of: 1.
Lands, possessory rights to land, ditch and water rights, and mining claims, both lode and placer. 2. That
which is affixed to the land. 3. That which is appurtenant to the land". During the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, the term "real property" has evolved beyond only tangible property and the
common law rarely addresses the arcane mining terms set forth in that section.
Apart from the above-cited Idaho statutes and common law, the annotations under Idaho Code
§ 11-1110 confirm the error of classifying a real estate mortgage as a form of personal property. For
example, in Fulton v. Dura, 108 Idaho 392, 700 P .2d 14 (1985), affirming Fulton v. Dura, 107 Idaho
240,687 P.2d 1367 (Ct.App. 1984), the appellate court held that a buyer's interest in a land sale contract
is an interest in real property within the meaning of section§ 10-1110. Id., 108 Idaho at 393. That is,
the listed forms of real property identified in section 55-101 are somewhat anachronistic and are not
exhaustive.
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THE DISTRICT COURT'S MORTGAGE-AS-PERSONAL PROPERTY
POSTULATION INFORMED (AND SKEWED) HIS ANALYSIS OF THE
ELEMENTS OF DUTY AND PROXIMATE CAUSATION.
Gist of malpractice: In addition to erroneously advising plaintiff that the divorce papers, as
drafted, would create a lien on all the ex-husband's real property, defendants failed to include in the PSA
the mortgage instrument number and legal description of the Albrethsen mortgage. See Idaho Code§
8-506A(d). According to plaintiff's expert, this omission prevented a judgment lien from attaching to
the mortgage proceeds (R. p. 496). 1 In the eyes of the District Court, these omissions were benign
because as "personal property" the mortgage ran free of any judgment liens.
Treating the mortgage as personal property was a death knell for the tort of malpractice: As
noted above, the District Court's view of a mortgage as personal property rendered the defendants'
actions without fault and without adverse consequences to plaintiff: "McKay's ex-husband's mortgage
on the Albrethsen property was personal property. Accordingly, recording the divorce decree, which
incorporated the PSA, did not give Ms. McKay a judgment lien on the mortgage" (R. p 969).
Viewing the Albrethsen mortgage as personal property resulted, inevitably, in the conclusion that
there could be no breach of duty or proximate causation. If the mortgage were personal property, it
would be futile to include in the PSA a legal description of the real property or instrument number of
the mortgage. Hence, the failure to do so would not be a breach of duty. By the same token, failure to
include this information would not be the proximate cause of plaintiff's financial loss because its
inclusion would not have liened the mortgage given its status as "personal property".

1Plaintiffs'

expert has opined that this additional information would have enabled defendants to
record an extract of judgment as further protection against the unencumbered payout of mortgage
proceeds to plaintiff's husband. See Idaho Code§ 32-918. (R. p. 495)
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The District Court did acknowledge that the recorded judgment, irrespective of the husband's
consent, imposed a judgment lien on all of the ex-husband's real property in the counties ofrecordation.
Walker and Cosho Humphrey recorded the divorce decree in several
counties. . . (Walker Aff. filed Jan. 6, 2011, para 20). By doing so,
they insured that McKay obtained a judgment lien in her ex-husband's
real property in the counties of recordation, see LC. § 10-1110, despite
that her ex-husband never agreed to grant her a security interest in his real
property.
R. p. 969 (emphasis in original).
As reflected in the affidavit of plaintiff's expert, the deficiency in defendant's work was the
failure to set forth in the PSA the legal description of the Albrethsen Farm property and the instrument
number of the recorded mortgage as to which the ex-husband was the mortgagee (R. p. 495). These
omissions, not the mortgage's perceived status as personal property, prevented plaintiffs judgment lien
from attaching to the Albrethsen mortgage.
As observed by the District Court, a judgment lien was created to protect plaintiff "despite that
her ex-husband never agreed to grant her a security interest in his real property" (R. p. 969). Consistent
with the District Court's confirmation of the non-consensual nature of a judgment lien, defendant Walker
admonished his client to proceed with stealth as respects the imminent judgment lien.
Our plan is to record the judgment and decree of divorce, which then
becomes a lien on all of Darwin's real and personal property. We
don't want to emphasize this aspect of the settlement. So we don't
want to say anything until the judge signs the Judgment and Decree.
R. p. 298.
The problem with the "plan" was that the Albrethsen mortgage was not liened because the
requisite mortgage was not in the judgment. LC. §8-506A(d).
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PROXIMATE CAUSATION EXISTS RESPECTING
DEFENDANTS' ERRONEOUS ADVICE THAT HUSBAND'S
OBLIGATION TO PLAINTIFF WAS SECURED.
The District Court concluded that the element of proximate causation is absent with respect to
the allegation that the defendants misled plaintiff into "believing the PSA granted her a security interest
in the mortgage" (R. p. 973 ). In its analysis, the Court posed the helpful hypothetical which addressed
plaintiffs options "had she tried to walk away from the deal", i.e., had the absence of security been
disclosed prior to her execution of the PSA.
First, the District Court accurately observed that there is no evidence that the ex-husband would
have granted her a consensual security interest "had she pressed the issue" (R. p. 974). That is, had the
absence of security been disclosed, it was not possible to obtain a security interest by agreement.
Secondly, as to a security interest by operation of law Gudgment lien), the District Court
concluded that the Handwritten Agreement (R. p. 269) "would have blocked her path back to divorce
court" (R. p. 974), i.e., "it did not provide for security of any kind". Id. Whether "blocked" or not, the
existence of the Handwritten Agreement is not a dispositive fact on the issue of proximate causation.
First, plaintiffs expectations of security existed at the time of the mediated settlement (and
Handwritten Agreement) and was based upon the advice of defendant Walker. As stated in her affidavit:
I held this belief at the time of settlement based upon the statement of my
attorney Thomas Walker that the recorded judgment would be a lien on
the mortgage held by Mr. McKay on the Status Corporation obligation
of approximately $1.4 million.
R. p. 552.
That is, had the absence of an explicit security provision in the Handwritten Agreement "blocked
her path" to obtaining that security, such blockage proximately arose by defendants' assurance of
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security. See plaintiff's affidavit and Walker's letters dated October 23, 2007 and December 15, 2008
R. pp. 298, 522). That is, if the Handwritten Agreement did "block her path" to further litigation, such
obstruction was the responsibility of defendant attorneys.
Secondly, the existence of the Handwritten Agreement did not foreclose security "by operation
oflaw", the other route to security identified by the District Court (R. p. 969). Both the District Court
and defendant Walker explicitly acknowledge that this security device is not dependent on the consent
of the debtor (R. pp. 298, 969). Had the PSA included the instrument number of the Albrethsen
mortgage and a legal description of the property, a judgment lien would have been imposed on the
mortgage. See Smith affidavit (R. p. 495). We must remember that, unlike the Handvvritten Agreement,
the PSA actually referenced the Albrethsen mortgage, not as security, but as a source of funds to remit
to plaintiff the $800,000 payment.
(R. p. 374).
The District Court recognized plaintiff's acquisition of a judgment lien "despite that her exhusband never agreed to grant her a security interest in his real property" (R. p. 969). Likewise,
defendant Walker, recognizing an incipient judgment lien, counseled reticence with respect to the
prospective lien on the ex-husband's real property until such time as "the judge signs the Judgment and
Decree" (R. p. 298).
That is, neither the Handwritten Agreement nor her husband's resistance to security, prevented
the creation of a judgment lien. In the event, the Handwritten Agreement is perceived to block plaintiff's
acquisition of security, that agreement was entered into by reason of defendants' advice that plaintiff
would be secured. In that event, such advice would be the proximate cause of plaintiff's financial loss.
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WHETHER THERE IS A BREACH OF DUTY OR PROXIMATE CAUSATION RAISES
FACTUAL QUESTIONS NOT AMENABLE TO SUMMARY ADJUDICATION.
The District Court ruled plaintiff's claim must fail due to the absence, as a matter of law, of the
indispensable elements of breach of duty and proximate causation. In the event, these elements had not
been ruled to be absent as a matter of law, they would then present factual issues not resolvable by
summary judgment.
In the usual case, evidence on these issues must be presented through an expert witness, i.e., an
attorney. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270,273, 731 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1968). That is, the existence, or
not, of malpractice is a fact not within the knowledge or experience of lay jurors. Corey v. Wilson, 93
Idaho 54, 58,454 P.2d 951,955 (1969).
Given the fact-intensive nature of these issues and the evidence admitted from plaintiff's expert,
genuine issues of material fact are presented which preclude summary disposition for that reason. Rule
56(c ), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION
By reason of (1) defendants' recommendation to accept the PSA which was incorporated into
the judgment and (2) their assurance that plaintiff would have a secured position on the $800,000
judgment debt, plaintiff failed to receive a substantial portion of the $800,000, her partial share of the
community estate.
The District Court correctly cited the applicable principle of law: recordation of the divorce
decree "ensured that McKay obtained a judgment lien in her ex-husband's real property in the counties
of recordation" (R. p. 969) (emphasis in original).
However, the identifying data of the Albrethsen mortgage (real property) was not properly set
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forth in the judgment so as to constitute a lien on the mortgage. See Idaho Code 8-506A(d). By
characterizing the mortgage as personal property and, therefore, not impacted by recordation, the District
Court committed an error of law, immunizing the defendants from allegations of breach of duty and
proximate causation.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that summary judgment be vacated and the matter remanded for
a trial on the merits.
Submitted this 13 th day of February, 2015.
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